Piper Alpha Movie 2017

SummaryThe investigation into the Piper Alpha disaster has much to teach us thirty years on. Most of the physical evidence sank to the bottom of the North Sea, so the testimony of survivors and witnesses had to be woven together into a coherent story. Figure 1: Locations of Piper Alpha, associated platforms and oil and gas terminals (Adapted from a drawing by Willie Scott 24/4/11) Personal safety over process safetyDespite the extensive fixed fire protection system on Piper Alpha, not a single drop of water was applied from Piper Alpha itself to any of the fires. Water alone would not have put the oil fires out (and with gas fires one should not even attempt to do so) but it might have cooled the structure and pipelines and have prevented — or at least significantly delayed — the gas line rupture which was the major escalating factor in the Piper Alpha disaster. After the rupture of the first gas line, Piper Alpha was doomed.So why didn’t the fire protection system activate as intended?For many years, the practice on Piper Alpha was to switch the fire pumps from automatic to manual when divers were in the sea. As diving was such a regular part of normal operation, in practice the pumps remained on manual most of the time.It is much easier to imagine the horror of a close colleague being sucked into a pipe (as had happened a few years earlier although the diver survived) and prioritise it over the danger of leaving 226 men unprotected in the highly unlikely event of fire.The assessment of risk was skewed.

The suction pipes under Piper Alpha were protected with grilles to prevent divers from being sucked in, although anyone within 5 metres of the inlet could be drawn towards them when the fire pumps started with the risk of serious injuries. On other rigs this was managed by close communication with divers and a temporary override used only when the divers were working within a short distance of the inlets, a relatively rare occurrence.When fire broke out on Piper Alpha, the only way to activate the fire-fighting system was to start the pumps locally. Despite valiant attempts, dense smoke and fire prevented anyone from reaching them.It is not known whether the initial explosion on Piper ruptured the fire water ring main or damaged the control system for the fire pumps. It is likely that electrical power was knocked out, but there was a diesel back-up.

It is not known how effective the deluge would have been had it deployed as the nozzles often blocked with scale and the fire-water pipework on Piper Alpha was undergoing phased replacement. Figure 2: PFD Condensate pumps and safety relief valves Permit to work and isolation for maintenanceThe night shift operators were aware that condensate injection pump A was out of commission for maintenance and also that maintenance had not yet started: the maintenance and associated work permits had been suspended overnight.The suspended work permits were not displayed in the control room but in the safety office. It appears that the operators were not aware of another suspended permit. The pressure relief valve for pump A had also been removed. Even if operators had gone to the safety office to check, permits in the safety office were filed by trade and not by location.The pressure relief valves for the condensate injection pumps were located one floor above the pumps. Although it is almost always best practice for a pressure relief valve to be sited as close as possible to the unit that it is protecting, condensate on the downstream side had to be able to drain to an appropriate vessel, so the valve was placed about 8 metres above (and 15 metres away from) the pump.In order to reinstate condensate injection pump A, two separate actions would have been required: reinstate electrical power and open the gas-operated suction and discharge valves. By reconnecting the air supplies to the valves, they could then be opened using toggle buttons on a local control panel by pump A.

Alpha Piper Video

There was no locking of isolation valves, spading or double-block-and-bleed in order to prevent re-pressurisation of a system isolated for maintenance.The permit to work system on Piper Alpha relied heavily on informal communication.The Cullen inquiry asked four questions of the permit to work system:1. Was the procedure adequate?2. Was the procedure complied with?3. Was there adequate training?4.

Was the procedure monitored?The answer to all four questions was no. HandoverOn Piper Alpha, communications between departments, between shifts, and between crews was personal, informal and tailored to the job. While bespoke communications can have some benefits, minimum standards were not set or met.Incoming crews were supposed to be given safety induction training by the safety department. There was a huge gap between what the safety department intended to convey, and what they actually conveyed. Communication is a two-way thing.

According to witnesses, if the newcomer had worked offshore before, then training was brief to the point of non-existent. The safety induction consisted of a being handed a booklet and told to read it.

Much of the information was out of date or inapplicable to Piper Alpha.Operators kept a log but often failed to record maintenance activities. Shift handover was a busy time. The Occidental procedure required maintenance and operations to meet, inspect the work site and sign off permits together. However, the operators were busy with their own handovers at the same time, and the practice developed where maintenance would sign off the permit and leave it in the control room or safety office. At shift changeover lead production operators would not review or discuss suspended permits. Figure 3: Location topside modules The ‘spark’ shows the site of missing PSV-504 which probably led to the initial leak InterconnectionsCommunications between Piper Alpha, Claymore, Tartan and MCP-01 were lost from the first explosions. This delayed shut-down on the other platforms, particularly on Claymore and Tartan.Could more rapid shutdown at the other platforms, and in particular blowdown or depressurization of the inter-platform gas lines have averted disaster?

Almost certainly not. Claymore, Tartan or MCP-01 could not be depressurised quickly enough. Too little gas could have been flared at the other platforms in the time available to make any real difference.However, shutting the inter-platform oil lines would probably have made a difference. The oil from Tartan to Claymore joined oil from Piper Alpha at a Y junction before flowing onwards to Flotta. Oil continued to be produced and exported into the line to Flotta for about an hour after the first explosion on Piper Alpha. The emergency shutdown valve on the Piper Alpha oil export line appears to have failed to close tightly, allowing the oil from Tartan and Claymore to take the easier reverse route onto Piper Alpha. Shutdown of oil production only started on Tartan at about 22.40 and on Claymore at about 23.00.Oil exported from Tartan and Claymore flowed out of the ruptured oil line on Piper Alpha, flooded the floor and overflowed to the floor beneath, starting a large pool fire which impinged directly on the gas import and export lines, leading to their rupture – and hence to the inevitable escalation of events on Piper Alpha.

Emergency response — evacuationOne of the most shocking aspects of the Piper Alpha tragedy was the inability to evacuate the personnel on board. It was assumed that, whatever happened, evacuation would be (at least substantially) by helicopter. This assumption, so easy to criticise with hindsight, was based on several premises, the most important being that no event on Piper Alpha would render the helideck inoperative almost immediately and that sufficient helicopters would be available to evacuate everyone on board.However, within about a minute of the first explosion, the helideck became enveloped in black smoke (presumably from oil fires) and helicopters could not land on it.The multi-function support vessel Tharos was close to Piper Alpha throughout the disaster.

Although not intended primarily as a fire-fighting vessel, Tharos had significant fire-fighting capabilities. The lack of communication from Piper Alpha led to a delay in deployment, then the demand for electrical power was so great that Tharos suffered an almost complete power failure, from which it took several minutes to recover. There was a subsequent delay, because so many monitors were opened that the water pressure fell to a level below that at which the discharge valve on the fire pump could be opened.

The safety systems on Tharos, good as they were, had never been tested in such extreme conditions before. When it came to it, the systems failed that test.No lifeboats or inflatable life rafts were launched successfully from Piper Alpha. All those who survived did so by making their way to the sea by whatever means they could. This included climbing down knotted ropes and jumping, from as high as the helideck, over 50 metres above sea level. Figure 4: Horizontal diagram with control room, radio room and gas compression module Safety cultureThere were many warnings that all was not well with safety management systems on Piper Alpha long before the accident.Less than a year earlier, on 07 September 1987, a contract rigger was killed in an accident on Piper Alpha. The accident highlighted the inadequacies of both the permit to work and the shift handover procedures. A golden opportunity to put these right was missed.When the disaster occurred, offshore safety was governed through the use of prescriptive regulations.

Such regulations have their uses, provided all eventualities have been considered. But a regulations-bound system falls down because practices not covered by regulations are simply not addressed.

Image captionHundreds of people attended the service to remember the 167 men who diedA minute's silence has been held in Aberdeen in memory of the 167 men who lost their lives in the Piper Alpha disaster 30 years ago.The name of each worker was read aloud at a service attended by hundreds of people at the Piper Alpha Memorial Garden in Aberdeen's Hazlehead Park.The platform, 120 miles north east of Aberdeen, exploded on 6 July 1988.The North Sea tragedy remains the world's worst offshore disaster. Sixty one people survived the disaster.A piper played a lament and prayers were said before wreaths were laid by Aberdeen Lord Provost Barney Crockett and Oil and Gas UK chief executive Deirdre Michie. Wreaths were also placed at the statue by Baroness Annabel Goldie, representing the UK government, and Scotland's Energy Minister Paul Wheelhouse.Members of the public then queued to lay flowers they had brought, many of them wiping away tears.The Rev Gordon Craig, chaplain to the UK offshore oil and gas industry, told those attending: 'Thirty years ago tonight, 167 men died in the worst disaster to befall the oil and gas industry.'

It was a night that changed many, many things. For the families at the heart of the tragedy, life would never be the same, as they were forced to cope without loved ones and the hole that was left in their lives.' So many families living in the city knew others - friends, neighbours, colleagues - who were directly caught up in the events of 6 July 1988.'

Image captionA minute's silence was held at the Piper Alpha MemorialLord Cullen's report into the disaster after a 13-month inquiry led to a.All 106 recommendations for the oil and gas industry were accepted.Following the memorial, Mr Wheelhouse said: 'It was a very moving service. We have to remember that those 167 individuals gave their lives to produce the energy we take for granted.' The industry needs to remember what happened and make sure it never happens again.'

The service was so anyone who wanted to see it - including workers offshore - could be involved. One, told BBC Scotland before the service: ' I remember it like it was yesterday. It's very vivid.' I managed to get out and off the platform about two minutes before the big fireball - a very sad moment because you knew when that fireball went up there would be people who were caught up in it.' I'll always be grateful that I got off. That I saw my children grow up and that I have grandchildren now.' But looking back 30 years you can't help thinking about my colleagues and friends who didn't survive.

And their families will be very sad remembering the occasion.' 'Never forget'Before the service, Ms Michie said: 'The coming together of industry is so important, reinforcing as it does that we continue to honour and keep in our thoughts, those who died as a result of that awful tragedy.' It is an important milestone in what is an ongoing journey - one in which we need to ensure every generation shares our determination that it will never happen again.' Les Linklater, executive director of the Step Change in Safety group, said of the live service broadcast: 'It's really important that everyone involved in the oil and gas industry, particularly those working offshore, have the opportunity to watch and be part of the Piper Alpha 30th Act of Remembrance.' Lord Provost Barney Crockett added: 'The Piper Alpha tragedy was 30 years ago, yet the events of that night are as shocking today three decades on. It will forever be imprinted on the Aberdeen memory.' We will never forget the 167 men who died in the tragedy - dads, sons, brothers, uncles, nephews, partners, friends and colleagues, and that is why it is so important that the City of Aberdeen and industry come together for this Act of Remembrance.'

The Health and Safety Executive (HSE) said in April it had.The regulator said some had come 'perilously close to disaster' and that more needed to be done to tackle them.